Tag: Threat Intelligence

Investigating a Multi-Stage PowerShell Loader

Anurag Gawande1 Comment

Introduction

During recent threat hunting, I identified suspicious PowerShell content being served directly from an IP address and a domain:

hxxp://203[.]188[.]171[.]166/
hxxps://dorenzaa[.]com/

Both locations returned PowerShell rather than a conventional user-facing webpage.

The PowerShell was responsible for retrieving a ZIP archive from Vercel-hosted infrastructure, extracting it locally, and executing an executable from the extracted content.

Further investigation identified additional Vercel-hosted artifacts, including executable files, ZIP archives, and heavily obfuscated PowerShell loaders. Analysis of those loaders revealed hidden PowerShell execution, dynamically constructed IEX, Base64 and XOR-based obfuscation, additional payload retrieval, and a decoy “Verification complete!” message presented to the user.

The original infection vector has not been identified. Therefore, this analysis begins from the earliest stage currently visible in my investigation and does not attempt to attribute the activity to a specific threat actor or campaign.

Initial Discovery

The investigation started with:

203[.]188[.]171[.]166
dorenzaa[.]com

Both locations were observed serving PowerShell code directly.

At the time of this analysis, VirusTotal showed no security-vendor detections for either the IP address or the domain.

However, direct inspection of the content being served from these locations revealed PowerShell responsible for retrieving and executing an additional payload.

VirusTotal detection status reflects the results available at the time of analysis and may change as vendors update their detections.

VirusTotal results for 203[.]188[.]171[.]166

VirusTotal results for dorenzaa[.]com

The lack of security vendor detections did not mean that the content being served was benign.

Direct inspection showed PowerShell code at both locations.

PowerShell served from 203[.]188[.]171[.]166

PowerShell served from dorenzaa[.]com

PowerShell Retrieves Grape2.zip

Analysis of the PowerShell showed that it creates a working directory under the victim’s local application data directory:

%LOCALAPPDATA%\jsDownload

It then retrieves:

hxxps://file-host-alpha[.]vercel[.]app/Grape2.zip

The archive is stored under the newly created directory and subsequently extracted.

The script then executes:

%LOCALAPPDATA%\jsDownload\Grape.exe

The observed SHA-256 for Grape2.zip was:

3eaf786bfb4ae5688b347511f98d74c948b7dc0749558acbdc6bbe33dcfa3a61

This established the first Vercel-hosted location identified during the investigation:

file-host-alpha[.]vercel[.]app

Further analysis of the archive and Grape.exe would be required to determine its complete functionality.

Possible Second-Stage Delivery Point

An important unanswered question is how a victim reaches 203[.]188[.]171[.]166 or dorenzaa[.]com in the first place.

These locations directly return executable PowerShell rather than presenting a typical user-facing lure.

Based on this behavior, the PowerShell-hosting URLs appear to represent second-stage delivery points.

An earlier, currently unidentified initial payload or script may be responsible for reaching these locations and executing the returned PowerShell on the victim’s machine.

The initial infection vector or first-stage payload has not been identified, so this remains an assessment rather than a confirmed complete execution chain.

Discovery of Additional Vercel-Hosted Infrastructure

During further investigation of the associated Vercel-hosted files, I identified another host:

file-host-5kidy7ph1-nyererebill-sudos-projects[.]vercel[.]app

Multiple files were observed hosted on this Vercel instance:

  • UltraToolliteSetup.exe
  • mat.zip
  • draw.zip
  • loader1.txt
  • loader2.txt
  • loader22.txt
  • 1.txt
  • 4_27_1.txt

This was particularly interesting because several of the .txt files contained PowerShell loaders or heavily obfuscated PowerShell stages.

Files hosted on the Vercel instance

The presence of these files on the same Vercel instance establishes an infrastructure relationship between the observed artifacts. It does not, by itself, establish that every file performs the same function or belongs to a single malware campaign.

loader2.txt and loader22.txt

Analysis of loader2.txt and loader22.txt showed that both files contain the same PowerShell stager. The script launches PowerShell in a hidden window, downloads loader1.txt from the Vercel-hosted location, constructs IEX (Invoke-Expression), and executes the retrieved PowerShell content.

The loader also displays a “Verification complete!” message with the title “Google.com”. This appears to act as a decoy while the PowerShell activity takes place in the background.

loader2.txt and loader22.txt have the same SHA-256, confirming that the observed files contain identical content:

f139bd347cba0b197c97ca084c224d8c779bdb9116a5327e9cf30b0f72a59530

loader2.txt / loader22.txt

PowerShell stager observed in loader2.txt and loader22.txt.

Google Verification Prompt

Verification complete!” prompt displayed by the PowerShell stager with “Google.com” as the window title.

loader1.txt: Heavy PowerShell Obfuscation

The next-stage loader1.txt file is considerably more difficult to inspect.

Rather than containing a small, immediately readable downloader, the file is heavily padded with junk code and irrelevant expressions.

The script contains large quantities of randomly named variables, unnecessary mathematical operations, fake conditions, irrelevant .NET references and other content designed to make the meaningful logic difficult to locate during manual inspection.

Obfuscated loader1.txt

Heavily padded and obfuscated PowerShell contained in loader1.txt

Despite the large amount of junk content, the meaningful decoding routine could be isolated.

The script contains embedded Base64 data, converts the data into a byte array, and applies a repeating XOR operation.

The repeating XOR key identified during analysis was: Write

Conceptually, the meaningful operation consists of:

Embedded Base64 data

  • Base64 decoding
  • Byte array
  • Repeating-key XOR (“write”)
  • Decoded PowerShell

The enormous size of the original loader is therefore misleading, the actual PowerShell recovered after deobfuscation is comparatively small.

Analysis of the heavily obfuscated loader1.txt revealed an embedded Base64-encoded payload that is decoded and processed using a repeating key XOR operation with the key write.

After removing the junk code and decoding the embedded data, the resulting PowerShell was much smaller and straightforward.

It downloads UltraToolliteSetup.exe from file-host-5kidy7ph1-nyererebill-sudos-projects[.]vercel[.]app, saves the executable as %APPDATA%\UltraToolliteSetup.exe, and executes it.

The observed SHA-256 for UltraToolliteSetup.exe is

d8620f4df9e0159a8db675868b4ed9a205638c847439f52cf1c88541d0655a64

Further analysis of the executable would be required to determine its final functionality.

Obfuscated and Deobfuscated loader1.txt

Deobfuscating 4_27_1.txt

Another heavily obfuscated PowerShell file observed on the same Vercel instance was 4_27_1.txt.

Like loader1.txt, the file contains substantial amounts of junk code and irrelevant expressions intended to make manual inspection more difficult. The sample contains repeated fake operations, random variable names and long encoded data embedded among the junk content.

Deobfuscating 4_27_1.txt revealed PowerShell responsible for retrieving draw.zip from the same Vercel-hosted infrastructure. The decoded script saves the archive as %APPDATA%\draw.zip, extracts its contents into %APPDATA%\Default, and then executes %APPDATA%\Default\draw.io.exe.

The observed payload URL was:

hxxps://file-host-5kidy7ph1-nyererebill-sudos-projects[.]vercel[.]app/draw.zip

The SHA-256 of the observed draw.zip archive was:

a25bbc466416f65726c5e3f587f69515dd003f114c1eab29fdfca7b52fbd74b1

Further analysis of draw.exe would be required to determine its final functionality.

Other Hosted Artifacts

Additional artifacts observed on the second Vercel instance included:

  • mat.zip
  • 1.txt

These files were collected during the investigation and their SHA-256 hashes are included in the IOC section below.

The presence of multiple loaders, archives and executables on the same hosting location is noteworthy, but infrastructure co-location alone is not sufficient to conclude that all of the artifacts perform the same function or represent a single campaign.

No threat actor attribution is being made based on the currently available evidence.

Observed Techniques

Across the PowerShell files analyzed so far, I observed:

  • PowerShell-based payload retrieval and execution
  • Hidden PowerShell process execution
  • Invoke-WebRequest and Copy-Item for remote content retrieval
  • Dynamically constructed IEX
  • Execution of remotely retrieved PowerShell
  • Base64-encoded data
  • Repeating-key XOR obfuscation
  • Extensive junk-code padding
  • ZIP-based payload delivery
  • Archive extraction using PowerShell
  • Execution from %APPDATA% and %LOCALAPPDATA%
  • Windows Forms-based decoy verification prompt
  • Vercel-hosted loaders and payloads

What Remains Unknown

Several important parts of the activity remain unresolved.

Most importantly, the initial infection vector has not been identified. The earliest infrastructure currently visible in this investigation, 203[.]188[.]171[.]166 and dorenzaa[.]com, directly returns PowerShell code.

This suggests that an earlier payload, command, script or other execution mechanism may be responsible for reaching these locations on the victim system. However, that preceding stage has not been observed.

The final functionality of several downloaded artifacts also requires further investigation, particularly:

Grape2.zip / Grape.exe
UltraToolliteSetup.exe
draw.zip / draw.io.exe
mat.zip

Further static and controlled dynamic analysis would be necessary to determine their final behavior and whether the individual delivery paths ultimately converge.

Indicators of Compromise

Infrastructure

  • 203[.]188[.]171[.]166
  • dorenzaa[.]com
  • file-host-alpha[.]vercel[.]app
  • file-host-5kidy7ph1-nyererebill-sudos-projects[.]vercel[.]app

Files and SHA-256

Filename: UltraToolliteSetup.exe
d8620f4df9e0159a8db675868b4ed9a205638c847439f52cf1c88541d0655a64

Filename: mat.zip
dbaf04df50088031ea64a9879c1adeee8b7e551c79dc247fa1bb4de5b263f7b4

Filename: draw.zip
a25bbc466416f65726c5e3f587f69515dd003f114c1eab29fdfca7b52fbd74b1

Filename: Grape2.zip
3eaf786bfb4ae5688b347511f98d74c948b7dc0749558acbdc6bbe33dcfa3a61

Filename: loader1.txt
fe693cc07c5d8a4d479e987e64ffb7473bd79066f3505e7f2c8f0b86815d0f08

Filename: loader2.txt
f139bd347cba0b197c97ca084c224d8c779bdb9116a5327e9cf30b0f72a59530

Filename: loader22.txt
f139bd347cba0b197c97ca084c224d8c779bdb9116a5327e9cf30b0f72a59530

Filename: 1.txt
e04487377e4f976ac18e7c1c5b22bc85e03b4423e73fd490e9d1641758faac81

Filename: 4_27_1.txt
4366679a4fea2c1bf7e29290f8e162e0db9d0707030b5b99ce870195afeb3782

loader2.txt and loader22.txt share the same SHA-256, indicating identical content under two filenames.

Observed File-System Paths

%LOCALAPPDATA%\jsDownload
%LOCALAPPDATA%\jsDownload\Grape2.zip
%LOCALAPPDATA%\jsDownload\Grape.exe

%APPDATA%\UltraToolliteSetup.exe

%APPDATA%\draw.zip
%APPDATA%\Default
%APPDATA%\Default\draw.io.exe

At the time of this analysis, several of the observed indicators and files had limited or no detection coverage on VirusTotal. These screenshots are included to document the detection state at the time of research. VirusTotal results can change over time as vendors update detections, so the screenshots should be treated as a point-in-time reference rather than a permanent verdict.

Conclusion

This investigation uncovered PowerShell-based payload delivery using Vercel-hosted infrastructure, including Grape2.zip, UltraToolliteSetup.exe, and draw.zip. Analysis of the hosted scripts revealed hidden PowerShell execution, obfuscation, dynamically constructed IEX, and a decoy “Google.com, Verification complete!” prompt. While the initial infection vector and final functionality of the downloaded executables remain unknown, the findings document multiple suspicious delivery stages and associated infrastructure that warrant further investigation.

Ongoing Phishing Campaign Abusing Google Cloud Storage to Redirect Users to Multiple Scam Pages

Anurag Gawande1 Comment

A few days ago, I published a blog analyzing a phishing campaign abusing Google Cloud infrastructure:

Analysis of an Integrated Phishing Campaign Utilizing Google Cloud Infrastructure

While continuing to monitor the infrastructure used in that campaign, I discovered several additional URLs hosted on Google Cloud Storage (storage[.]googleapis[.]com) that appear to be part of the same ecosystem. These pages act as intermediate redirectors, sending victims to a wide variety of phishing and scam sites hosted primarily on the .autos TLD.

What is interesting is that a single Google Cloud Storage page appears to function as a central redirect hub, distributing victims across multiple scam themes such as fake surveys, reward scams, antivirus alerts, job offers, and account storage warnings.

Newly Observed Google Cloud Storage URLs

The following URLs were identified during the investigation:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/strow.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/noonchi/noon.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/hmd.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/wetaobao/taobao.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/lithesome/stepupnow.html

One particular page stood out during analysis:

This page appears to function as a traffic distribution page, redirecting visitors to multiple phishing sites depending on campaign configuration.

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html

I also shared an earlier observation on X (Twitter):

Traffic Redirection to .autos Phishing Domains

The redirector page was observed sending users to various phishing domains, most of which are hosted under the .autos top-level domain.

These phishing sites are themed around different scams designed to lure victims into providing personal or financial information.

Below are the different campaign themes identified.

Netflix Reward Phishing Pages

Some pages impersonate Netflix reward programs, claiming users have won prizes or special promotions.

Domains involved:

digital-shift-us-bin[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos

Additional domains were also shared by an X user @skocherhan quoting my earlier post:

Additional domains observed:

goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos

These pages typically present users with messages claiming they have been selected for a Netflix reward or promotional giveaway, encouraging them to complete a short survey to claim their prize.

Like the other scams in this campaign, the pages ultimately attempt to collect personal or payment information, often under the pretext of paying a small shipping fee or verifying eligibility.

Fake Dell Laptop Giveaway Survey

Another variation promotes a Dell laptop giveaway, typically claiming that users can win a Dell 16 DC16250 laptop worth $699.99.

Domains hosting these pages include:

avgeasyposttips[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
gold-avg-pe-nb[.]autos
tra4fficjumpchoiceclever[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos
shifttra4fficcapsmatch[.]autos
digitalshiftusbin[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
rot-digital-fly-f2f[.]autos

These pages typically:

  • Ask the victim to answer a few survey questions.
  • Display a congratulatory message.
  • Request credit card details to pay for shipping fees.

Fake “AI Data Assistant – Earn $500/day” Job Lure

Another theme used in this campaign promotes a fake online job opportunity, claiming users can earn $500 per day as an AI data assistant.

Observed domains:

verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
pushbuttonsystem[.]net
lifeverifiedfavouritever[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos

These pages typically claim:

  • No experience required
  • High daily earnings
  • Work from home opportunities

Users are often redirected through several steps designed to collect personal information or push affiliate offers.

“Antivirus Subscription Expired” Phishing Pages

Another set of pages impersonates security alerts, claiming the user’s antivirus subscription has expired.

Domains observed:

safepremiumfreeriskfree[.]autos
nationalrecommendsafesmart[.]autos
deviceriskfreesafe[.]autos
freespeedpopular[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
speeddeviceboostfast[.]autos
programeffectivespeedfast[.]autos

These pages typically:

  • Display fake security warnings
  • Urge users to renew antivirus protection
  • Redirect victims to payment or affiliate pages.

“Cloud Storage Full” Phishing Pages

Another variation of this campaign uses cloud storage warnings, claiming the user’s storage account is full.

Observed domains:

stairs-table-fire.autos
tablewordstairs[.]autos
ceilwordinteriorbowl[.]autos
safe-premium-free-riskfree[.]autos
nationalprotectsmartfree[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
ceil-word-interior-bowl[.]autos
free-speed-popular-guard[.]autos
device-safe-clean-boost[.]autos
boost-premium-recommend-effective[.]autos
trk[.]independent-teacher-strength-nails[.]run

Additional domains were also shared by an X user quoting my earlier post:

These pages often mimic services such as:

  • Google Drive
  • iCloud

The goal is to scare victims into clicking through fake upgrade or security alerts.

Fake Walmart Survey Scam

Several phishing domains impersonate Walmart survey reward campaigns, often promising a free gift or prize in exchange for completing a short survey.

Domains observed:

jumpdiganalyticsprt[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
cleververifieddigitalmatch[.]autos
altbio[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
matchstarsrotchoice[.]autos
directvolcapsus[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos

These pages typically display messages such as:

  • “Congratulations! You have been selected to receive a reward”
  • “Complete a short Walmart survey to claim your prize”

After the survey is completed, victims are usually asked to pay a small shipping fee, where credit card information is harvested.

Key Observation

One of the most notable aspects of this campaign is the central role of the Google Cloud Storage page:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html

During testing, this page was observed redirecting users to multiple phishing domains across different scam themes.

This suggests it is functioning as a traffic distribution or redirect infrastructure, allowing attackers to rotate phishing destinations while keeping the initial delivery URL stable.

Using Google Cloud Storage also adds a layer of trust, as the domain belongs to a legitimate cloud provider.

Another interesting observation is that a single .autos domain can serve multiple phishing page themes after redirection from the Google Cloud Storage page. Depending on the redirection path or parameters, the same domain may host different scams such as:

  • Fake surveys
  • Reward scams
  • Storage full alerts
  • Antivirus subscription warnings
  • Job offer lures

This behavior indicates that the attackers are likely using a shared phishing kit or centralized backend infrastructure, allowing them to quickly rotate scam themes while reusing the same domains.

Another observation is the high volume of phishing emails currently being distributed using this infrastructure. Over the past few days, I have been receiving around 40–50 phishing emails within a 24-hour period, many of which contain links to Google Cloud Storage pages that act as redirectors to the phishing ecosystem described in this report.

URLs repeatedly observed in these emails include:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Google Cloud URLs

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/strow.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/noonchi/noon.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/hmd.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/wetaobao/taobao.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/lithesome/stepupnow.html

Phishing Domains

digital-shift-us-bin[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
gold-avg-pe-nb[.]autos
tra4fficjumpchoiceclever[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos
shifttra4fficcapsmatch[.]autos
digitalshiftusbin[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
rot-digital-fly-f2f[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
pushbuttonsystem[.]net
lifeverifiedfavouritever[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
safepremiumfreeriskfree[.]autos
nationalrecommendsafesmart[.]autos
deviceriskfreesafe[.]autos
freespeedpopular[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
speeddeviceboostfast[.]autos
programeffectivespeedfast[.]autos
stairs-table-fire.autos
tablewordstairs[.]autos
ceilwordinteriorbowl[.]autos
safe-premium-free-riskfree[.]autos
nationalprotectsmartfree[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
ceil-word-interior-bowl[.]autos
free-speed-popular-guard[.]autos
device-safe-clean-boost[.]autos
boost-premium-recommend-effective[.]autos
trk[.]independent-teacher-strength-nails[.]run
jumpdiganalyticsprt[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
cleververifieddigitalmatch[.]autos
altbio[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
matchstarsrotchoice[.]autos
directvolcapsus[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos

This campaign demonstrates how attackers continue to abuse trusted cloud infrastructure such as Google Cloud Storage to host redirectors that distribute victims to multiple phishing pages.

By using legitimate cloud services as part of the attack chain, threat actors can increase credibility and reduce the likelihood of immediate blocking.

The use of large numbers of disposable .autos domains further allows attackers to rotate phishing pages frequently while keeping the delivery infrastructure intact.

In addition, the system appears to restrict repeated access attempts from the same IP address. After a user successfully reaches a phishing page through the redirector, subsequent attempts to access similar URLs from the same IP may result in the page failing to load or redirecting to unrelated sites. This behavior suggests the presence of IP-based filtering or traffic distribution logic, commonly used in malicious traffic distribution systems (TDS) to control how often a visitor can access the phishing infrastructure.

Crypto Compensation Scam: Fake BTC Payout Lure Abusing Survey & Payment Flows

Anurag Gawande1 Comment

Overview

I recently came across a message containing the following link:

hxxps://yandex[.]com/poll/PdZ7vgekGrNakuXZcpiB6b

At first, it didn’t look suspicious. It opened as a simple survey/poll page. But as I continued, the flow quickly shifted into a crypto reward scenario, claiming that I was eligible to receive a Bitcoin compensation payment.

And as expected with these kinds of lures, there’s a catch.

Before you can withdraw the funds, you’re asked to pay a small “commission” fee.

Full Scam Walkthrough (Video)

This gives a better idea of how smoothly the entire flow is designed to push the victim toward payment.

Infection / Lure flow

1. Initial Entry (Survey / Poll Page)

The flow starts with a Yandex poll link, which works as a kind of entry point.

This step likely serves multiple purposes. It helps make the interaction feel legitimate since it’s hosted on a known platform. It may also act as a basic filter to distinguish real users from automated systems. More importantly, it sets up the next stage of redirection.

2. Fake Bitcoin Compensation Page

After interacting with the poll, I was redirected to a page that looks like it belongs to a Bitcoin related service.

The page presents a sense of urgency by claiming that a new transaction of 0.943 BTC has been created and already marked as approved. It then introduces pressure by warning the user to withdraw the funds within 24 hours, a tactic commonly used to rush victims into taking immediate action without verifying the legitimacy of the claim.

This is where the emotional hook kicks in. Seeing a large amount like 0.943 BTC immediately grabs attention.

3. Social Engineering via Chat Assistant

Then a chat window appears, introducing a support agent.

The message explains that to complete the payment process, you need to register your profile in a compensation system. It sounds procedural and official, which is exactly the intention.

Shortly after, the real objective becomes clear.

You are asked to:

Pay $67 for legal profile registration services

4. Payment Gateway

Clicking the payment link takes you to a dedicated payment page.

Here, everything is carefully designed to appear legitimate and trustworthy. The page shows a specific payment amount of $67, provides a Bitcoin payment option via a QR code, and displays a wallet address to reinforce authenticity. On top of that, a countdown timer indicating invoice expiry adds urgency, subtly pressuring the user to complete the transaction quickly without questioning its validity.

The design mimics real crypto payment processors, which helps reduce suspicion.

The flow is quite structured and intentional.

It starts by engaging the user through a trusted platform, which lowers initial suspicion. Then it introduces a high-value crypto reward, creating excitement. A chat assistant adds a layer of interaction, making the process feel guided and legitimate.

Finally, the user is asked to pay a relatively small fee to unlock a much larger reward.

This is essentially an advance fee scam, adapted to fit into a crypto themed narrative.

Additional Variant Observed (Octa-Themed Flow)

While analyzing further, I encountered another link that follows the same backend scam logic, but with a different initial presentation.

The flow eventually leads to the same outcome, pay a commission to withdraw BTC.

Variant Walkthrough (Video)

1. Fake Account / Transfer Notification

This version starts with a fake dashboard impersonating Octa.

The page further attempts to lure users by displaying a message stating “You have a new money transfer”, along with a balance of 1.824 BTC. This presentation is crafted to create excitement and curiosity, making it seem like the user has unexpectedly received funds, while subtly encouraging them to engage with the page and follow the next steps without questioning its authenticity.

2. Fake Login & Temporary Password Flow

The user is asked to log in using a temporary password.

This step closely mimics real authentication flows to build trust and credibility. It displays a temporary password, includes an OTP style input field, and reinforces legitimacy with messaging like “Do not share this password!”. These familiar elements are designed to make the process feel secure and authentic, lowering suspicion while guiding the user further into the flow.

3. Transaction Dashboard

After logging in, the user is presented with a dashboard that appears highly convincing, displaying details such as the sender labeled as Octa, a balance of 1.824 BTC, and a status marked as paid. The layout, wording, and transaction details are all carefully crafted to create a sense of authenticity, making the entire interface look legitimate and encouraging the user to trust the process without suspicion.

4. Commission Justification

Before allowing any withdrawal, the platform introduces an additional requirement in the form of a commission fee of around $69, accompanied by an explanation about wallet limits and transfer rules. This step is designed to appear reasonable and procedural, giving the impression that the fee is a standard part of the process while subtly nudging the user to make a payment in order to access the supposed funds.

5. Payment Page

Just like the initial flow, the process ultimately leads to a familiar payment stage, presenting a Bitcoin payment request along with a QR code and a wallet address for convenience. An expiry timer is also displayed to create urgency, pressuring the user to act quickly and complete the payment without taking the time to question the legitimacy of the request.

What stands out is how the attackers reuse the same core scam but change the entry point.

I also looked into related activity on URLScan and found similar lures being actively scanned in the last couple of days, which indicates that this is not a one off campaign but something currently active and evolving.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

URLs

Along with the observed infrastructure, I checked domain registration timelines, which further indicate that this campaign is relatively recent and actively being used.

  • cosibas[.]site – Registered on 2026-01-30
  • paybits[.]cc – Registered on 2026-02-02

hxxps://yandex[.]com/poll/PdZ7vgekGrNakuXZcpiB6b
hxxps://yandex[.]com/poll/GjSFvwyKcmEMXpzm6yDExc
hxxps://cosibas[.]site/bloc/anketa-sent.html
hxxps://cosibas[.]site/octa/
hxxps://paybits[.]cc/payment/

Cloudflare Pages “Continue Read” Redirect Kit Abused for Phishing, Adware, and Malware Delivery

Anurag Gawande1 Comment

I identified a long-running redirect infrastructure abusing Cloudflare Pages (pages.dev) to host benign-looking SEO articles (for example, celebrity “net worth” blogs or gaming help content) that display a forced “Continue reading / Continue Read” pop-up shortly after page load.

Once the user clicks the button, the browser is redirected into downstream infrastructure that may lead to:

  • Credential-harvesting phishing pages
  • Adware / PUP installers
  • Trojan or malware droppers
  • Fake browser download lures (observed: Opera-themed “diagnostics” funnel)
  • QR-code / fake CAPTCHA social-engineering pages

More than 250 URLs were observed using the same visual template and behavior, and historical evidence from URLScan shows activity persisting for 5 months, suggesting deliberate reputation building and SEO indexing.

Initial Infection Vector: Benign SEO Content on Cloudflare Pages

The landing pages appear as normal blog articles but automatically display a modal message:

“Continue reading by clicking the button below.”

This design ensures the redirect is user-initiated, helping bypass automated scanners and reputation systems.

Common characteristics

  • Hosted on: *.pages.dev
  • SEO-style article content
  • Modal overlay appears a few seconds after page load
  • Redirect only occurs after button click

Scale, Persistence, and Search Engine Exposure

Across the analyzed samples, more than 250 distinct URLs were identified showing identical UI and UX behavior, indicating the use of the same phishing template or kit deployed across different article topics. The activity has remained visible for approximately five months based on URLScan observations, suggesting persistence rather than short-lived campaigns. Additionally, some of these pages have been indexed in Google search results, significantly increasing the likelihood of exposure to real users and amplifying the overall risk posed by the operation.

Redirect Logic (Click-Gated Pre-Lander Behavior)

The redirect mechanism is implemented using delayed modal display and a click-triggered JavaScript redirect.

Key Observation

Across many different pages, most samples use the same redirect destination inside window.open()

This is important because it shows that the pages.dev sites are probably not standalone phishing pages created one by one. Instead, they appear to work more like traffic pre-landers that quietly direct visitors to a shared backend system. The key= parameter in the URL also looks intentional rather than random, and it is likely being used for tracking or routing within the campaign, possibly as a campaign ID, an affiliate tracking token, or even a value used to classify or group potential victims.

In short:

Multiple benign-looking SEO pages are acting as entry points into a centralized redirect infrastructure.

Central Redirector Role in the Infection Chain

The shared redirect endpoint:

hxxps://preservationwristwilling[.]com/utx3iw6i?key=<token>

likely serves as a Traffic Distribution System (TDS) decision node, responsible for:

  • Geo/IP filtering
  • Proxy/VPN detection
  • User-agent validation
  • Campaign routing
  • Conditional payload delivery

Simplified Kill Chain

Anti-Analysis Behavior: Proxy / VPN Detection

During testing, downstream pages performed VPN/Proxy checks.

If anonymity was detected, the page displayed:

“Anonymous Proxy detected.”

and stopped further redirection.

Security Impact

From a security perspective, this behavior is particularly concerning because it makes deeper analysis much harder. By blocking or redirecting automated environments, it can prevent sandboxes and researchers from ever reaching the real payload, which in turn leads to very low antivirus detection rates. As a result, automated scans may incorrectly appear clean, creating a false sense of safety even though malicious activity may still be present behind the scenes.

Observed Downstream Outcomes

1) Fake File Download Funnel – S3 ZIP Payload

One redirect path showed a “Your File Download Is Ready” page, leading to:

  • Intermediate download host (e.g., loaditfile[.]com)
  • Final payload stored on Amazon S3 (SetupFile-xxxx.zip)

2) Fake Browser Diagnostics – Opera Download Lure

Another branch displayed a fake compatibility/diagnostics score (e.g., 40/100) urging users to:

“Download Opera Browser”

This pattern feels very similar to the affiliate-driven browser installation funnels often seen in malvertising campaigns, where traffic is quietly redirected through multiple steps before reaching the final payload or monetization stage.

3) QR Code / Fake CAPTCHA Social Engineering

Some redirects presented:

  • “Prove you are not a robot”
  • QR code requiring mobile scan

Flows like this are commonly designed to move victims step by step toward the attacker’s real objective. In many cases, the final destination can be a phishing page that steals credentials, a subscription fraud scheme that silently charges the user, or even the delivery of mobile malware disguised as a legitimate download.

Payload Example and Low Detection Context

One observed executable sample (adware/PUP classification):

SHA256: be590100ecdcae5ce4b7b42f87082e201fcb2f38c114c8fbc6640ad9b9a0708a

VirusTotal showed detection

What makes this particularly notable is that the overall setup closely matches how modern malvertising Traffic Distribution Systems (TDS) typically operate. The infrastructure shows several familiar patterns, such as abusing a trusted hosting platform like Cloudflare Pages, allowing pages to be indexed by search engines to attract organic traffic, and using click-gated redirects to evade automated analysis. Behind the scenes, everything appears to funnel through a centralized redirect endpoint where the final payload can be delivered conditionally, depending on the visitor. This kind of design also supports multiple monetization paths rather than a single outcome. Taken together, it suggests we are not looking at just one phishing kit, but a broader shared redirect ecosystem designed to distribute traffic at scale.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Domain

  • preservationwristwilling[.]com
  • Path: /utx3iw6i
  • Query Parameter: key=<token>
  • loaditfile[.]com

Malicious Sample

  • be590100ecdcae5ce4b7b42f87082e201fcb2f38c114c8fbc6640ad9b9a0708a
  • Windows Executable
  • Classification: Adware/PUP
  • VirusTotal Detection

Network Indicator

preservationwristwilling[.]com/utx3iw6i?key=

URLScan.io search result

This campaign highlights how attackers carefully blend several techniques to stay under the radar and keep their operation running for long periods. By abusing legitimate hosting services, leveraging SEO poisoning to attract real users, using click-triggered redirects to avoid automated detection, and routing visitors through a centralized traffic system, they create a stealthy and resilient infrastructure capable of quietly delivering malware or other malicious outcomes over time