Ongoing Phishing Campaign Abusing Google Cloud Storage to Redirect Users to Multiple Scam Pages

A few days ago, I published a blog analyzing a phishing campaign abusing Google Cloud infrastructure:

While continuing to monitor the infrastructure used in that campaign, I discovered several additional URLs hosted on Google Cloud Storage (storage[.]googleapis[.]com) that appear to be part of the same ecosystem. These pages act as intermediate redirectors, sending victims to a wide variety of phishing and scam sites hosted primarily on the .autos TLD.

What is interesting is that a single Google Cloud Storage page appears to function as a central redirect hub, distributing victims across multiple scam themes such as fake surveys, reward scams, antivirus alerts, job offers, and account storage warnings.

Newly Observed Google Cloud Storage URLs

The following URLs were identified during the investigation:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/strow.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/noonchi/noon.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/hmd.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/wetaobao/taobao.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/lithesome/stepupnow.html

One particular page stood out during analysis:

This page appears to function as a traffic distribution page, redirecting visitors to multiple phishing sites depending on campaign configuration.

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html

I also shared an earlier observation on X (Twitter):

Traffic Redirection to .autos Phishing Domains

The redirector page was observed sending users to various phishing domains, most of which are hosted under the .autos top-level domain.

These phishing sites are themed around different scams designed to lure victims into providing personal or financial information.

Below are the different campaign themes identified.

Netflix Reward Phishing Pages

Some pages impersonate Netflix reward programs, claiming users have won prizes or special promotions.

Domains involved:

digital-shift-us-bin[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos

Additional domains were also shared by an X user @skocherhan quoting my earlier post:

Additional domains observed:

goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos

These pages typically present users with messages claiming they have been selected for a Netflix reward or promotional giveaway, encouraging them to complete a short survey to claim their prize.

Like the other scams in this campaign, the pages ultimately attempt to collect personal or payment information, often under the pretext of paying a small shipping fee or verifying eligibility.

Fake Dell Laptop Giveaway Survey

Another variation promotes a Dell laptop giveaway, typically claiming that users can win a Dell 16 DC16250 laptop worth $699.99.

Domains hosting these pages include:

avgeasyposttips[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
gold-avg-pe-nb[.]autos
tra4fficjumpchoiceclever[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos
shifttra4fficcapsmatch[.]autos
digitalshiftusbin[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
rot-digital-fly-f2f[.]autos

These pages typically:

  • Ask the victim to answer a few survey questions.
  • Display a congratulatory message.
  • Request credit card details to pay for shipping fees.

Fake “AI Data Assistant – Earn $500/day” Job Lure

Another theme used in this campaign promotes a fake online job opportunity, claiming users can earn $500 per day as an AI data assistant.

Observed domains:

verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
pushbuttonsystem[.]net
lifeverifiedfavouritever[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos

These pages typically claim:

  • No experience required
  • High daily earnings
  • Work from home opportunities

Users are often redirected through several steps designed to collect personal information or push affiliate offers.

“Antivirus Subscription Expired” Phishing Pages

Another set of pages impersonates security alerts, claiming the user’s antivirus subscription has expired.

Domains observed:

safepremiumfreeriskfree[.]autos
nationalrecommendsafesmart[.]autos
deviceriskfreesafe[.]autos
freespeedpopular[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
speeddeviceboostfast[.]autos
programeffectivespeedfast[.]autos

These pages typically:

  • Display fake security warnings
  • Urge users to renew antivirus protection
  • Redirect victims to payment or affiliate pages.

“Cloud Storage Full” Phishing Pages

Another variation of this campaign uses cloud storage warnings, claiming the user’s storage account is full.

Observed domains:

stairs-table-fire.autos
tablewordstairs[.]autos
ceilwordinteriorbowl[.]autos
safe-premium-free-riskfree[.]autos
nationalprotectsmartfree[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
ceil-word-interior-bowl[.]autos
free-speed-popular-guard[.]autos
device-safe-clean-boost[.]autos
boost-premium-recommend-effective[.]autos
trk[.]independent-teacher-strength-nails[.]run

Additional domains were also shared by an X user quoting my earlier post:

These pages often mimic services such as:

  • Google Drive
  • iCloud

The goal is to scare victims into clicking through fake upgrade or security alerts.

Fake Walmart Survey Scam

Several phishing domains impersonate Walmart survey reward campaigns, often promising a free gift or prize in exchange for completing a short survey.

Domains observed:

jumpdiganalyticsprt[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
cleververifieddigitalmatch[.]autos
altbio[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
matchstarsrotchoice[.]autos
directvolcapsus[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos

These pages typically display messages such as:

  • “Congratulations! You have been selected to receive a reward”
  • “Complete a short Walmart survey to claim your prize”

After the survey is completed, victims are usually asked to pay a small shipping fee, where credit card information is harvested.

Key Observation

One of the most notable aspects of this campaign is the central role of the Google Cloud Storage page:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html

During testing, this page was observed redirecting users to multiple phishing domains across different scam themes.

This suggests it is functioning as a traffic distribution or redirect infrastructure, allowing attackers to rotate phishing destinations while keeping the initial delivery URL stable.

Using Google Cloud Storage also adds a layer of trust, as the domain belongs to a legitimate cloud provider.

Another interesting observation is that a single .autos domain can serve multiple phishing page themes after redirection from the Google Cloud Storage page. Depending on the redirection path or parameters, the same domain may host different scams such as:

  • Fake surveys
  • Reward scams
  • Storage full alerts
  • Antivirus subscription warnings
  • Job offer lures

This behavior indicates that the attackers are likely using a shared phishing kit or centralized backend infrastructure, allowing them to quickly rotate scam themes while reusing the same domains.

Another observation is the high volume of phishing emails currently being distributed using this infrastructure. Over the past few days, I have been receiving around 40–50 phishing emails within a 24-hour period, many of which contain links to Google Cloud Storage pages that act as redirectors to the phishing ecosystem described in this report.

URLs repeatedly observed in these emails include:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Google Cloud URLs

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/strow.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/noonchi/noon.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/hmd.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/wetaobao/taobao.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/lithesome/stepupnow.html

Phishing Domains

digital-shift-us-bin[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
gold-avg-pe-nb[.]autos
tra4fficjumpchoiceclever[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos
shifttra4fficcapsmatch[.]autos
digitalshiftusbin[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
rot-digital-fly-f2f[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
pushbuttonsystem[.]net
lifeverifiedfavouritever[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
safepremiumfreeriskfree[.]autos
nationalrecommendsafesmart[.]autos
deviceriskfreesafe[.]autos
freespeedpopular[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
speeddeviceboostfast[.]autos
programeffectivespeedfast[.]autos
stairs-table-fire.autos
tablewordstairs[.]autos
ceilwordinteriorbowl[.]autos
safe-premium-free-riskfree[.]autos
nationalprotectsmartfree[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
ceil-word-interior-bowl[.]autos
free-speed-popular-guard[.]autos
device-safe-clean-boost[.]autos
boost-premium-recommend-effective[.]autos
trk[.]independent-teacher-strength-nails[.]run
jumpdiganalyticsprt[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
cleververifieddigitalmatch[.]autos
altbio[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
matchstarsrotchoice[.]autos
directvolcapsus[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos

This campaign demonstrates how attackers continue to abuse trusted cloud infrastructure such as Google Cloud Storage to host redirectors that distribute victims to multiple phishing pages.

By using legitimate cloud services as part of the attack chain, threat actors can increase credibility and reduce the likelihood of immediate blocking.

The use of large numbers of disposable .autos domains further allows attackers to rotate phishing pages frequently while keeping the delivery infrastructure intact.

In addition, the system appears to restrict repeated access attempts from the same IP address. After a user successfully reaches a phishing page through the redirector, subsequent attempts to access similar URLs from the same IP may result in the page failing to load or redirecting to unrelated sites. This behavior suggests the presence of IP-based filtering or traffic distribution logic, commonly used in malicious traffic distribution systems (TDS) to control how often a visitor can access the phishing infrastructure.

Yoroi Wallet Phishing Abuses GoTo Resolve and ScreenConnect for Device Takeover

Overview

I recently came across a phishing campaign impersonating the Yoroi Desktop Wallet, targeting cryptocurrency users with what looked like a legitimate upgrade.

The email itself was clean and well-written. It talked about improved security, hardware wallet support, and even AI-based scam detection. Nothing immediately stood out as suspicious. The landing page looked polished too, with proper branding and a familiar layout.

The Setup

The phishing email redirects users to a domain:

hxxps://download[.]v1desktop-yoroiwallet[.]com/

the domain was recently registered (Feb 2026), yet it was already indexed on Google, meaning users could also land on it via search results, not just email.

The Download That Isn’t a Wallet

The site promotes a “Yoroi Desktop” download, but instead of hosting anything legitimate, it redirects to a file-sharing service and delivers an MSI file:

hxxps://store-na-phx-1.gofile.io/download/direct/900a7e14-a15a-41f6-94fb-c88603d09463/YoroiDesktop-installer.msi

hxxps://cold8[.]gofile[.]io/download/direct/900a7e14-a15a-41f6-94fb-c88603d09463/YoroiDesktop-installer.msi

hxxps://store-na-phx-5[.]gofile[.]io/download/direct/87c6015b-8a47-4cde-9e31-aaacd3f4193c/YoroiDesktop-installer.msi

Running the installer doesn’t give you a wallet. It installs GoTo Resolve (LogMeIn) in unattended mode.

Silent Remote Access via GoTo Resolve

File name: YoroiDesktop-installer.msi
File hash: 8634AD3C6488D6A27719C5341E91EEB9
File name: unattended-updater.exe
File hash: 2A2D9B03AA6185F434568F5F4C42BF49

Once executed, the system is quietly enrolled into a remote access setup. There’s no obvious warning, no suspicious pop-ups, just a legitimate tool being used in the wrong way.

Looking at the configuration reveals what’s happening behind the scenes:

CompanyId: 5504330483880245799
Namespace: syn-prd-ava-unattended
FleetTemplateName: syn-prd-ava-unattended

This isn’t random. It shows the machine is being registered into a pre-configured remote access fleet, controlled by whoever owns that GoTo Resolve tenant.

At this point, the attacker doesn’t need to trick the user anymore. They already have what they need, persistent access to the device.

A Second Variant: ScreenConnect

File hash: e79a47fc85955123f0821223a4cf2595
File name: yoroi-wallet.msi

While pivoting on this activity through URLScan, I came across another domain following the same theme:

yoroi-wallet[.]org

This one doesn’t use GoTo Resolve. Instead, it delivers a payload based on ConnectWise ScreenConnect, another legitimate remote access tool.

Inside the dropped configuration file, the intent becomes clear:

The important part here is the relay server:

instance-p1b26i-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com

This tells the client exactly where to connect. Once installed, the system reaches out to that server and establishes a remote session.

Again, no exploit, no malware in the traditional sense, just legitimate software used to gain control.

A Familiar Pattern

This isn’t the first time I’ve seen something like this.

It closely resembles a campaign I previously analyzed where RMM tools were abused in a crypto wallet distribution flow:

One thing that stands out across both campaigns is how the payload is delivered.

In all cases, the final MSI files are not hosted directly on the phishing domains. Instead, the sites redirect users to gofile[.]io, a legitimate file-sharing service, to download the installer.

This adds another layer of evasion. Hosting the MSI on a legitimate service like gofile makes it harder to block and also reduces suspicion from users, since the download doesn’t come directly from the phishing domain.

While digging further into this, I also noticed that the MSI files are hosted across multiple gofile storage endpoints such as:

store-na-phx-[1/4/5].gofile.io/download/direct/

Changing the server index (for example, 1, 4, or 5) reveals similar download paths hosting MSI files that follow the same theme, crypto wallet installers that actually deploy RMM tools.

Combined with the use of legitimate tools like GoTo Resolve (LogMeIn) and delivery through trusted file-sharing services, the overall chain appears clean on the surface but ultimately leads to full remote access.

Indicators

URLs

v1desktop-yoroiwallet[.]com
yoroi-wallet[.]org
instance-p1b26i-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com
YoroiDesktop-installer.msi
yoroi-wallet.msi
CompanyId: 5504330483880245799
Namespace: syn-prd-ava-unattended

File Hash

8634ad3c6488d6a27719c5341e91eeb9
2a2d9b03aa6185f434568f5f4c42bf49
e79a47fc85955123f0821223a4cf2595
be8c2d03333cbd13dab654260c60b025