Cloudflare Pages “Continue Read” Redirect Kit Abused for Phishing, Adware, and Malware Delivery

I identified a long-running redirect infrastructure abusing Cloudflare Pages (pages.dev) to host benign-looking SEO articles (for example, celebrity “net worth” blogs or gaming help content) that display a forced “Continue reading / Continue Read” pop-up shortly after page load.

Once the user clicks the button, the browser is redirected into downstream infrastructure that may lead to:

  • Credential-harvesting phishing pages
  • Adware / PUP installers
  • Trojan or malware droppers
  • Fake browser download lures (observed: Opera-themed “diagnostics” funnel)
  • QR-code / fake CAPTCHA social-engineering pages

More than 250 URLs were observed using the same visual template and behavior, and historical evidence from URLScan shows activity persisting for 5 months, suggesting deliberate reputation building and SEO indexing.

Initial Infection Vector: Benign SEO Content on Cloudflare Pages

The landing pages appear as normal blog articles but automatically display a modal message:

“Continue reading by clicking the button below.”

This design ensures the redirect is user-initiated, helping bypass automated scanners and reputation systems.

Common characteristics

  • Hosted on: *.pages.dev
  • SEO-style article content
  • Modal overlay appears a few seconds after page load
  • Redirect only occurs after button click

Scale, Persistence, and Search Engine Exposure

Across the analyzed samples, more than 250 distinct URLs were identified showing identical UI and UX behavior, indicating the use of the same phishing template or kit deployed across different article topics. The activity has remained visible for approximately five months based on URLScan observations, suggesting persistence rather than short-lived campaigns. Additionally, some of these pages have been indexed in Google search results, significantly increasing the likelihood of exposure to real users and amplifying the overall risk posed by the operation.

Redirect Logic (Click-Gated Pre-Lander Behavior)

The redirect mechanism is implemented using delayed modal display and a click-triggered JavaScript redirect.

Key Observation

Across many different pages, most samples use the same redirect destination inside window.open()

This is important because it shows that the pages.dev sites are probably not standalone phishing pages created one by one. Instead, they appear to work more like traffic pre-landers that quietly direct visitors to a shared backend system. The key= parameter in the URL also looks intentional rather than random, and it is likely being used for tracking or routing within the campaign, possibly as a campaign ID, an affiliate tracking token, or even a value used to classify or group potential victims.

In short:

Multiple benign-looking SEO pages are acting as entry points into a centralized redirect infrastructure.

Central Redirector Role in the Infection Chain

The shared redirect endpoint:

hxxps://preservationwristwilling[.]com/utx3iw6i?key=<token>

likely serves as a Traffic Distribution System (TDS) decision node, responsible for:

  • Geo/IP filtering
  • Proxy/VPN detection
  • User-agent validation
  • Campaign routing
  • Conditional payload delivery

Simplified Kill Chain

Anti-Analysis Behavior: Proxy / VPN Detection

During testing, downstream pages performed VPN/Proxy checks.

If anonymity was detected, the page displayed:

“Anonymous Proxy detected.”

and stopped further redirection.

Security Impact

From a security perspective, this behavior is particularly concerning because it makes deeper analysis much harder. By blocking or redirecting automated environments, it can prevent sandboxes and researchers from ever reaching the real payload, which in turn leads to very low antivirus detection rates. As a result, automated scans may incorrectly appear clean, creating a false sense of safety even though malicious activity may still be present behind the scenes.

Observed Downstream Outcomes

1) Fake File Download Funnel – S3 ZIP Payload

One redirect path showed a “Your File Download Is Ready” page, leading to:

  • Intermediate download host (e.g., loaditfile[.]com)
  • Final payload stored on Amazon S3 (SetupFile-xxxx.zip)

2) Fake Browser Diagnostics – Opera Download Lure

Another branch displayed a fake compatibility/diagnostics score (e.g., 40/100) urging users to:

“Download Opera Browser”

This pattern feels very similar to the affiliate-driven browser installation funnels often seen in malvertising campaigns, where traffic is quietly redirected through multiple steps before reaching the final payload or monetization stage.

3) QR Code / Fake CAPTCHA Social Engineering

Some redirects presented:

  • “Prove you are not a robot”
  • QR code requiring mobile scan

Flows like this are commonly designed to move victims step by step toward the attacker’s real objective. In many cases, the final destination can be a phishing page that steals credentials, a subscription fraud scheme that silently charges the user, or even the delivery of mobile malware disguised as a legitimate download.

Payload Example and Low Detection Context

One observed executable sample (adware/PUP classification):

SHA256: be590100ecdcae5ce4b7b42f87082e201fcb2f38c114c8fbc6640ad9b9a0708a

VirusTotal showed detection

What makes this particularly notable is that the overall setup closely matches how modern malvertising Traffic Distribution Systems (TDS) typically operate. The infrastructure shows several familiar patterns, such as abusing a trusted hosting platform like Cloudflare Pages, allowing pages to be indexed by search engines to attract organic traffic, and using click-gated redirects to evade automated analysis. Behind the scenes, everything appears to funnel through a centralized redirect endpoint where the final payload can be delivered conditionally, depending on the visitor. This kind of design also supports multiple monetization paths rather than a single outcome. Taken together, it suggests we are not looking at just one phishing kit, but a broader shared redirect ecosystem designed to distribute traffic at scale.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Domain

  • preservationwristwilling[.]com
  • Path: /utx3iw6i
  • Query Parameter: key=<token>
  • loaditfile[.]com

Malicious Sample

  • be590100ecdcae5ce4b7b42f87082e201fcb2f38c114c8fbc6640ad9b9a0708a
  • Windows Executable
  • Classification: Adware/PUP
  • VirusTotal Detection

Network Indicator

preservationwristwilling[.]com/utx3iw6i?key=

URLScan.io search result

This campaign highlights how attackers carefully blend several techniques to stay under the radar and keep their operation running for long periods. By abusing legitimate hosting services, leveraging SEO poisoning to attract real users, using click-triggered redirects to avoid automated detection, and routing visitors through a centralized traffic system, they create a stealthy and resilient infrastructure capable of quietly delivering malware or other malicious outcomes over time

Fake “Fast Ray VPN” Site on Cloudflare Pages Leading to PUA Downloads

While reviewing historical scans on URLScan, I came across a VPN-themed website hosted on Cloudflare Pages

hxxps://fast-ray-vpn.pages.dev/

At first glance, the site looks like a harmless VPN review blog. It features clean formatting, long-form written content, fake ratings, and well-structured download sections. Nothing immediately stands out as malicious, which is likely why the site has remained accessible for months.

What makes this case notable is that URLScan shows this domain has been publicly reachable for at least eight months, with multiple scans recorded over time. This is not a short lived phishing page or a throwaway redirect, it appears to be stable infrastructure.

A Convincing VPN Review That Builds False Trust

The landing page presents itself as a review article titled “Fast Ray VPN Review: Secure & Fast Mobile VPN?”. It includes a star rating of 4.8, all designed to look credible.

Download Links That Don’t Deliver a VPN

Near the bottom of the page, two links are presented as:

“Download via Link 1”
“Download via Link 2”

Clicking either of these does not lead to an app store, an official vendor site, or even a branded installer page. Instead, users are redirected to a third-party domain:

hxxps://normallydemandedalter[.]com

The URLs include long query strings with tracking keys, strongly suggesting affiliate or traffic broker infrastructure rather than software hosting.

In many cases, the redirect lands on a generic page stating

“Your File Download Is Ready!”

There is no mention of a VPN, no vendor name, no file hash, and no explanation of what is about to be downloaded.

As shown in the above screenshot, one such redirect path leads to insecthoney[.]xyz, where clicking the download button results in OperaSetup.exe being delivered. While Opera itself is legitimate software, the context is deceptive. Users are led to believe they are downloading a VPN client, but instead receive an unrelated browser installer distributed.

This OperaSetup.exe is getting delivered through below domains:

  • insecthoney[.]xyz
  • valueeye[.]xyz

Pixelsee PUA Delivered Through One Redirect Path

During sandbox testing, both redirect paths associated with the two download links were observed delivering a PUA payload, including the Pixelsee sample previously referenced. However, the behavior was not consistent. The same URLs did not always result in a file download and, in several cases, redirected to unrelated advertising or affiliate destinations instead. This indicates that payload delivery is randomized or condition-based, likely controlled by backend traffic distribution logic rather than being tied to a single fixed URL.

1. hxxps://normallydemandedalter.com/y4gw4zmhi3?key=14baee5d6a64addb406346147543b508

2. hxxps://normallydemandedalter.com/bhb7puzj?key=13033e82c537ba388cf82fed63dcfc88

That file is already flagged on VirusTotal and detected as Pixelsee PUA. The Pixelsee site itself again presents a clean, minimal download page with a prominent “Download” button and almost no transparency about the software’s purpose.

File Hash: 3856355ad00016cf21e0492fc5db2fd6
File Name: PixelSee_id1604692id.exe
File Size: 4.35MB
File Type: PE32

Inconsistent Outcomes and Traffic Monetization

Revisiting the same download URLs does not consistently result in the same behavior.

In multiple attempts, instead of receiving a file, the browser was redirected to completely unrelated destinations, including:

  • TikTok video pages
  • XM trading platform landing pages
  • Ad-related sites such as adzilla/.meme
  • Adult-themed click-through domains like best-girls-around/.com

This inconsistency strongly indicates the use of a traffic distribution system (TDS). Depending on conditions such as IP reputation.

VPN and Sandbox Detection Blocking Visibility

When accessing normallydemandedalter[.]com through a VPN or sandbox environment, the site responds with a simple message

“Anonymous Proxy detected.”

Once this message appears, no further redirects or downloads occur. This behavior effectively blocks

  • VPN users
  • Cloud-based sandboxes
  • Automated analysis systems

This explains why the site can remain live for months while still evading deeper inspection. The actual payload delivery only happens when the visitor appears to be a “real” user.

Visibility in Google Search Results

An additional point worth highlighting is that the Fast Ray VPN site is not buried or obscure. A simple Google search for “fast ray vpn” currently surfaces the Cloudflare Pages site within the top search results, appearing alongside legitimate Google Play and Apple App Store listings. This positioning significantly increases the likelihood of real users landing on the page organically, especially those searching for a VPN by name and expecting an official or review-based result. Combined with the site’s long uptime and clean presentation, this search visibility further amplifies its effectiveness as a traffic funnel.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators were observed during hands-on analysis and sandbox testing. They are linked to a deceptive VPN-themed page that redirects users through third-party infrastructure and, in some cases, delivers potentially unwanted applications. The redirects do not behave consistently. Sometimes a file is downloaded, other times users are sent to unrelated advertising or affiliate pages. This kind of behavior suggests traffic is being routed and monetized dynamically rather than through a single, fixed download path.

Domains

  • fast-ray-vpn.pages.dev
  • normallydemandedalter.com
  • insecthoney.xyz
  • valueeye.xyz
  • pixel-see.com
  • adzilla.meme
  • best-girls-around.com
  • xm.com

URL’s

  • hxxps://fast-ray-vpn.pages.dev/
  • hxxps://normallydemandedalter[.]com/y4gw4zmhi3?key=14baee5d6a64addb406346147543b508
  • hxxps://normallydemandedalter[.]com/bhb7puzj?key=13033e82c537ba388cf82fed63dcfc88
  • hxxps://insecthoney.xyz/?affId=2266&o=519&title…
  • hxxps://valueeye[.]xyz/?affId=2266&o=473&title=SETUPFILE&t=download_s1…..

File Hashes (PUA)

MD5: 3856355ad00016cf21e0492fc5db2fd6

The Fast Ray VPN site is not a legitimate VPN service and not a genuine review platform. It functions as a persistent traffic lure, redirecting users into affiliate and PUA distribution chains while actively blocking VPNs and sandboxes.

Its long lifespan suggests an effective design that prioritizes persistence and user reach while avoiding signals that typically lead to rapid takedown.