Ongoing Phishing Campaign Abusing Google Cloud Storage to Redirect Users to Multiple Scam Pages

A few days ago, I published a blog analyzing a phishing campaign abusing Google Cloud infrastructure:

While continuing to monitor the infrastructure used in that campaign, I discovered several additional URLs hosted on Google Cloud Storage (storage[.]googleapis[.]com) that appear to be part of the same ecosystem. These pages act as intermediate redirectors, sending victims to a wide variety of phishing and scam sites hosted primarily on the .autos TLD.

What is interesting is that a single Google Cloud Storage page appears to function as a central redirect hub, distributing victims across multiple scam themes such as fake surveys, reward scams, antivirus alerts, job offers, and account storage warnings.

Newly Observed Google Cloud Storage URLs

The following URLs were identified during the investigation:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/strow.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/noonchi/noon.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/hmd.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/wetaobao/taobao.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/lithesome/stepupnow.html

One particular page stood out during analysis:

This page appears to function as a traffic distribution page, redirecting visitors to multiple phishing sites depending on campaign configuration.

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html

I also shared an earlier observation on X (Twitter):

Traffic Redirection to .autos Phishing Domains

The redirector page was observed sending users to various phishing domains, most of which are hosted under the .autos top-level domain.

These phishing sites are themed around different scams designed to lure victims into providing personal or financial information.

Below are the different campaign themes identified.

Netflix Reward Phishing Pages

Some pages impersonate Netflix reward programs, claiming users have won prizes or special promotions.

Domains involved:

digital-shift-us-bin[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos

Additional domains were also shared by an X user @skocherhan quoting my earlier post:

Additional domains observed:

goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos

These pages typically present users with messages claiming they have been selected for a Netflix reward or promotional giveaway, encouraging them to complete a short survey to claim their prize.

Like the other scams in this campaign, the pages ultimately attempt to collect personal or payment information, often under the pretext of paying a small shipping fee or verifying eligibility.

Fake Dell Laptop Giveaway Survey

Another variation promotes a Dell laptop giveaway, typically claiming that users can win a Dell 16 DC16250 laptop worth $699.99.

Domains hosting these pages include:

avgeasyposttips[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
gold-avg-pe-nb[.]autos
tra4fficjumpchoiceclever[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos
shifttra4fficcapsmatch[.]autos
digitalshiftusbin[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
rot-digital-fly-f2f[.]autos

These pages typically:

  • Ask the victim to answer a few survey questions.
  • Display a congratulatory message.
  • Request credit card details to pay for shipping fees.

Fake “AI Data Assistant – Earn $500/day” Job Lure

Another theme used in this campaign promotes a fake online job opportunity, claiming users can earn $500 per day as an AI data assistant.

Observed domains:

verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
pushbuttonsystem[.]net
lifeverifiedfavouritever[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos

These pages typically claim:

  • No experience required
  • High daily earnings
  • Work from home opportunities

Users are often redirected through several steps designed to collect personal information or push affiliate offers.

“Antivirus Subscription Expired” Phishing Pages

Another set of pages impersonates security alerts, claiming the user’s antivirus subscription has expired.

Domains observed:

safepremiumfreeriskfree[.]autos
nationalrecommendsafesmart[.]autos
deviceriskfreesafe[.]autos
freespeedpopular[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
speeddeviceboostfast[.]autos
programeffectivespeedfast[.]autos

These pages typically:

  • Display fake security warnings
  • Urge users to renew antivirus protection
  • Redirect victims to payment or affiliate pages.

“Cloud Storage Full” Phishing Pages

Another variation of this campaign uses cloud storage warnings, claiming the user’s storage account is full.

Observed domains:

stairs-table-fire.autos
tablewordstairs[.]autos
ceilwordinteriorbowl[.]autos
safe-premium-free-riskfree[.]autos
nationalprotectsmartfree[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
ceil-word-interior-bowl[.]autos
free-speed-popular-guard[.]autos
device-safe-clean-boost[.]autos
boost-premium-recommend-effective[.]autos
trk[.]independent-teacher-strength-nails[.]run

Additional domains were also shared by an X user quoting my earlier post:

These pages often mimic services such as:

  • Google Drive
  • iCloud

The goal is to scare victims into clicking through fake upgrade or security alerts.

Fake Walmart Survey Scam

Several phishing domains impersonate Walmart survey reward campaigns, often promising a free gift or prize in exchange for completing a short survey.

Domains observed:

jumpdiganalyticsprt[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
cleververifieddigitalmatch[.]autos
altbio[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
matchstarsrotchoice[.]autos
directvolcapsus[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos

These pages typically display messages such as:

  • “Congratulations! You have been selected to receive a reward”
  • “Complete a short Walmart survey to claim your prize”

After the survey is completed, victims are usually asked to pay a small shipping fee, where credit card information is harvested.

Key Observation

One of the most notable aspects of this campaign is the central role of the Google Cloud Storage page:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html

During testing, this page was observed redirecting users to multiple phishing domains across different scam themes.

This suggests it is functioning as a traffic distribution or redirect infrastructure, allowing attackers to rotate phishing destinations while keeping the initial delivery URL stable.

Using Google Cloud Storage also adds a layer of trust, as the domain belongs to a legitimate cloud provider.

Another interesting observation is that a single .autos domain can serve multiple phishing page themes after redirection from the Google Cloud Storage page. Depending on the redirection path or parameters, the same domain may host different scams such as:

  • Fake surveys
  • Reward scams
  • Storage full alerts
  • Antivirus subscription warnings
  • Job offer lures

This behavior indicates that the attackers are likely using a shared phishing kit or centralized backend infrastructure, allowing them to quickly rotate scam themes while reusing the same domains.

Another observation is the high volume of phishing emails currently being distributed using this infrastructure. Over the past few days, I have been receiving around 40–50 phishing emails within a 24-hour period, many of which contain links to Google Cloud Storage pages that act as redirectors to the phishing ecosystem described in this report.

URLs repeatedly observed in these emails include:

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Google Cloud URLs

storage[.]googleapis[.]com/whilewait/successcomes.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/strow.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/noonchi/noon.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/sndrr/hmd.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/wetaobao/taobao.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/savelinge/goforward.html
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/lithesome/stepupnow.html

Phishing Domains

digital-shift-us-bin[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos
goldavgpenb[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
bio-easy-pe-loading[.]autos
analytics-mail-post-quite[.]autos
favouritebiochoicelife[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
searchonboardloadingrock[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
gold-avg-pe-nb[.]autos
tra4fficjumpchoiceclever[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos
shifttra4fficcapsmatch[.]autos
digitalshiftusbin[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
rot-digital-fly-f2f[.]autos
verifieddreamseriesultimate[.]autos
pushbuttonsystem[.]net
lifeverifiedfavouritever[.]autos
mailanalyticsvolseries[.]autos
spacevertabnb[.]autos
safepremiumfreeriskfree[.]autos
nationalrecommendsafesmart[.]autos
deviceriskfreesafe[.]autos
freespeedpopular[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
speeddeviceboostfast[.]autos
programeffectivespeedfast[.]autos
stairs-table-fire.autos
tablewordstairs[.]autos
ceilwordinteriorbowl[.]autos
safe-premium-free-riskfree[.]autos
nationalprotectsmartfree[.]autos
guardpopularinstalldevice[.]autos
ceil-word-interior-bowl[.]autos
free-speed-popular-guard[.]autos
device-safe-clean-boost[.]autos
boost-premium-recommend-effective[.]autos
trk[.]independent-teacher-strength-nails[.]run
jumpdiganalyticsprt[.]autos
avgeasyposttips[.]autos
cleververifieddigitalmatch[.]autos
altbio[.]autos
alt-dig-gold-tab[.]autos
matchstarsrotchoice[.]autos
directvolcapsus[.]autos
digprtdreamavg[.]autos

This campaign demonstrates how attackers continue to abuse trusted cloud infrastructure such as Google Cloud Storage to host redirectors that distribute victims to multiple phishing pages.

By using legitimate cloud services as part of the attack chain, threat actors can increase credibility and reduce the likelihood of immediate blocking.

The use of large numbers of disposable .autos domains further allows attackers to rotate phishing pages frequently while keeping the delivery infrastructure intact.

In addition, the system appears to restrict repeated access attempts from the same IP address. After a user successfully reaches a phishing page through the redirector, subsequent attempts to access similar URLs from the same IP may result in the page failing to load or redirecting to unrelated sites. This behavior suggests the presence of IP-based filtering or traffic distribution logic, commonly used in malicious traffic distribution systems (TDS) to control how often a visitor can access the phishing infrastructure.

Fake “Fast Ray VPN” Site on Cloudflare Pages Leading to PUA Downloads

While reviewing historical scans on URLScan, I came across a VPN-themed website hosted on Cloudflare Pages

hxxps://fast-ray-vpn.pages.dev/

At first glance, the site looks like a harmless VPN review blog. It features clean formatting, long-form written content, fake ratings, and well-structured download sections. Nothing immediately stands out as malicious, which is likely why the site has remained accessible for months.

What makes this case notable is that URLScan shows this domain has been publicly reachable for at least eight months, with multiple scans recorded over time. This is not a short lived phishing page or a throwaway redirect, it appears to be stable infrastructure.

A Convincing VPN Review That Builds False Trust

The landing page presents itself as a review article titled “Fast Ray VPN Review: Secure & Fast Mobile VPN?”. It includes a star rating of 4.8, all designed to look credible.

Download Links That Don’t Deliver a VPN

Near the bottom of the page, two links are presented as:

“Download via Link 1”
“Download via Link 2”

Clicking either of these does not lead to an app store, an official vendor site, or even a branded installer page. Instead, users are redirected to a third-party domain:

hxxps://normallydemandedalter[.]com

The URLs include long query strings with tracking keys, strongly suggesting affiliate or traffic broker infrastructure rather than software hosting.

In many cases, the redirect lands on a generic page stating

“Your File Download Is Ready!”

There is no mention of a VPN, no vendor name, no file hash, and no explanation of what is about to be downloaded.

As shown in the above screenshot, one such redirect path leads to insecthoney[.]xyz, where clicking the download button results in OperaSetup.exe being delivered. While Opera itself is legitimate software, the context is deceptive. Users are led to believe they are downloading a VPN client, but instead receive an unrelated browser installer distributed.

This OperaSetup.exe is getting delivered through below domains:

  • insecthoney[.]xyz
  • valueeye[.]xyz

Pixelsee PUA Delivered Through One Redirect Path

During sandbox testing, both redirect paths associated with the two download links were observed delivering a PUA payload, including the Pixelsee sample previously referenced. However, the behavior was not consistent. The same URLs did not always result in a file download and, in several cases, redirected to unrelated advertising or affiliate destinations instead. This indicates that payload delivery is randomized or condition-based, likely controlled by backend traffic distribution logic rather than being tied to a single fixed URL.

1. hxxps://normallydemandedalter.com/y4gw4zmhi3?key=14baee5d6a64addb406346147543b508

2. hxxps://normallydemandedalter.com/bhb7puzj?key=13033e82c537ba388cf82fed63dcfc88

That file is already flagged on VirusTotal and detected as Pixelsee PUA. The Pixelsee site itself again presents a clean, minimal download page with a prominent “Download” button and almost no transparency about the software’s purpose.

File Hash: 3856355ad00016cf21e0492fc5db2fd6
File Name: PixelSee_id1604692id.exe
File Size: 4.35MB
File Type: PE32

Inconsistent Outcomes and Traffic Monetization

Revisiting the same download URLs does not consistently result in the same behavior.

In multiple attempts, instead of receiving a file, the browser was redirected to completely unrelated destinations, including:

  • TikTok video pages
  • XM trading platform landing pages
  • Ad-related sites such as adzilla/.meme
  • Adult-themed click-through domains like best-girls-around/.com

This inconsistency strongly indicates the use of a traffic distribution system (TDS). Depending on conditions such as IP reputation.

VPN and Sandbox Detection Blocking Visibility

When accessing normallydemandedalter[.]com through a VPN or sandbox environment, the site responds with a simple message

“Anonymous Proxy detected.”

Once this message appears, no further redirects or downloads occur. This behavior effectively blocks

  • VPN users
  • Cloud-based sandboxes
  • Automated analysis systems

This explains why the site can remain live for months while still evading deeper inspection. The actual payload delivery only happens when the visitor appears to be a “real” user.

Visibility in Google Search Results

An additional point worth highlighting is that the Fast Ray VPN site is not buried or obscure. A simple Google search for “fast ray vpn” currently surfaces the Cloudflare Pages site within the top search results, appearing alongside legitimate Google Play and Apple App Store listings. This positioning significantly increases the likelihood of real users landing on the page organically, especially those searching for a VPN by name and expecting an official or review-based result. Combined with the site’s long uptime and clean presentation, this search visibility further amplifies its effectiveness as a traffic funnel.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators were observed during hands-on analysis and sandbox testing. They are linked to a deceptive VPN-themed page that redirects users through third-party infrastructure and, in some cases, delivers potentially unwanted applications. The redirects do not behave consistently. Sometimes a file is downloaded, other times users are sent to unrelated advertising or affiliate pages. This kind of behavior suggests traffic is being routed and monetized dynamically rather than through a single, fixed download path.

Domains

  • fast-ray-vpn.pages.dev
  • normallydemandedalter.com
  • insecthoney.xyz
  • valueeye.xyz
  • pixel-see.com
  • adzilla.meme
  • best-girls-around.com
  • xm.com

URL’s

  • hxxps://fast-ray-vpn.pages.dev/
  • hxxps://normallydemandedalter[.]com/y4gw4zmhi3?key=14baee5d6a64addb406346147543b508
  • hxxps://normallydemandedalter[.]com/bhb7puzj?key=13033e82c537ba388cf82fed63dcfc88
  • hxxps://insecthoney.xyz/?affId=2266&o=519&title…
  • hxxps://valueeye[.]xyz/?affId=2266&o=473&title=SETUPFILE&t=download_s1…..

File Hashes (PUA)

MD5: 3856355ad00016cf21e0492fc5db2fd6

The Fast Ray VPN site is not a legitimate VPN service and not a genuine review platform. It functions as a persistent traffic lure, redirecting users into affiliate and PUA distribution chains while actively blocking VPNs and sandboxes.

Its long lifespan suggests an effective design that prioritizes persistence and user reach while avoiding signals that typically lead to rapid takedown.

Analysis of a Fake Cloudflare Turnstile Used as a Traffic Filtering Gate

Overview

During analysis of a phishing URL chain, I observed a fake Cloudflare Turnstile verification page acting as an intelligent traffic filtering gate. Rather than protecting a website, this page selectively blocks, redirects, or allows access based on geolocation, proxy usage, and browser fingerprinting.

This phishing infrastructure demonstrates Traffic Distribution System like behavior commonly used in modern phishing and scam operations to evade security researchers, sandboxes, and automated crawlers while delivering payloads only to high-confidence victims.

Redirection Chain

The Cloudflare page is not legitimate and does not load any official Turnstile JavaScript. Instead, it is a static imitation combined with heavy client side fingerprinting.

Fake Cloudflare Verification Page

The landing page is designed to closely mimic a legitimate Cloudflare interstitial, creating a false sense of trust for the victim. It displays the French language title “Un instant…“, along with Cloudflare style branding and logos to appear authentic. A fake human verification checkbox labeled “Vérifiez que vous êtes humain” is presented, imitating Cloudflare’s Turnstile challenge, despite performing no real validation. The page also shows a fabricated Ray ID, a detail commonly associated with genuine Cloudflare error or verification pages. To further reinforce legitimacy, the attackers include links pointing to real Cloudflare policy and documentation pages, a tactic intended to reduce suspicion and bypass casual scrutiny by users and automated scanners alike.

However, no real Turnstile challenge exists. All logic is client side JavaScript + server side decision APIs, not Cloudflare infrastructure.

Browser Fingerprinting & Bot Detection

Once the page loads, the script silently collects a detailed browser fingerprint, including:

  • navigator.userAgent
  • navigator.webdriver (Selenium / automation detection)
  • Headless browser indicators
  • Plugin count and language settings
  • WebGL vendor and renderer (VM / sandbox detection)
  • LocalStorage and SessionStorage availability
  • Timezone information
  • Honeypot fields (website, email-confirm) to detect autofill bots

All of this data is packaged and exfiltrated to backend endpoints such as:

/_internal/base/validation/collect_info.php
/_internal/api/dashboard.php

Geo Blocking and Proxy Detection

Using Fiddler with different exit locations, the server’s decision engine responses were captured. These responses clearly show country based blocking and proxy detection logic.

This confirms explicit detection of hosting providers, VPNs, and proxy infrastructure, even when traffic originates from France.

Decoy Redirect Behavior

If a visitor is classified as blocked or suspicious, the page redirects to:

hxxps://www.mediapart.fr

This serves multiple purposes:

  • Makes the site appear benign during casual inspection
  • Misleads analysts and automated scanners
  • Prevents security tools from accessing the real phishing content

Only approved traffic (likely residential French IPs, real browsers) proceeds to the malicious landing page.

Why France?

Several indicators strongly suggest that this phishing infrastructure is specifically oriented toward French users. The landing page content and interface are fully localized in French (fr_FR), indicating deliberate language targeting rather than generic reuse. Access behavior appears to follow a country based allow list model, where visitors from non-French regions are blocked or redirected. When access conditions are not met, the site redirects to a well-known French news outlet as a decoy, helping the infrastructure appear benign during casual checks. Additionally, all CAPTCHA elements and user interface text are presented entirely in French, reinforcing the assessment that this setup is designed to blend seamlessly into a French browsing context and evade suspicion among local users.

Infrastructure Observations

Both domains involved in the redirect chain were newly registered on 2026-01-06.

Detection And Hunting Notes

Defenders should look for:

  • Fake Cloudflare Turnstile pages without official Cloudflare JS
  • Hidden honeypot form fields
  • /collect_info.php or /dashboard.php?action=visit patterns
  • Conditional redirects to legitimate news sites
  • Different behavior between residential vs proxy IPs

Confirmed malicious phishing traffic distribution system.

This is not a Cloudflare protection page.
It is a selective traffic gate designed to evade analysis and deliver phishing content only to real victims.

Source