Yoroi Wallet Phishing Abuses GoTo Resolve and ScreenConnect for Device Takeover

Overview

I recently came across a phishing campaign impersonating the Yoroi Desktop Wallet, targeting cryptocurrency users with what looked like a legitimate upgrade.

The email itself was clean and well-written. It talked about improved security, hardware wallet support, and even AI-based scam detection. Nothing immediately stood out as suspicious. The landing page looked polished too, with proper branding and a familiar layout.

The Setup

The phishing email redirects users to a domain:

hxxps://download[.]v1desktop-yoroiwallet[.]com/

the domain was recently registered (Feb 2026), yet it was already indexed on Google, meaning users could also land on it via search results, not just email.

The Download That Isn’t a Wallet

The site promotes a “Yoroi Desktop” download, but instead of hosting anything legitimate, it redirects to a file-sharing service and delivers an MSI file:

hxxps://store-na-phx-1.gofile.io/download/direct/900a7e14-a15a-41f6-94fb-c88603d09463/YoroiDesktop-installer.msi

hxxps://cold8[.]gofile[.]io/download/direct/900a7e14-a15a-41f6-94fb-c88603d09463/YoroiDesktop-installer.msi

hxxps://store-na-phx-5[.]gofile[.]io/download/direct/87c6015b-8a47-4cde-9e31-aaacd3f4193c/YoroiDesktop-installer.msi

Running the installer doesn’t give you a wallet. It installs GoTo Resolve (LogMeIn) in unattended mode.

Silent Remote Access via GoTo Resolve

File name: YoroiDesktop-installer.msi
File hash: 8634AD3C6488D6A27719C5341E91EEB9
File name: unattended-updater.exe
File hash: 2A2D9B03AA6185F434568F5F4C42BF49

Once executed, the system is quietly enrolled into a remote access setup. There’s no obvious warning, no suspicious pop-ups, just a legitimate tool being used in the wrong way.

Looking at the configuration reveals what’s happening behind the scenes:

CompanyId: 5504330483880245799
Namespace: syn-prd-ava-unattended
FleetTemplateName: syn-prd-ava-unattended

This isn’t random. It shows the machine is being registered into a pre-configured remote access fleet, controlled by whoever owns that GoTo Resolve tenant.

At this point, the attacker doesn’t need to trick the user anymore. They already have what they need, persistent access to the device.

A Second Variant: ScreenConnect

File hash: e79a47fc85955123f0821223a4cf2595
File name: yoroi-wallet.msi

While pivoting on this activity through URLScan, I came across another domain following the same theme:

yoroi-wallet[.]org

This one doesn’t use GoTo Resolve. Instead, it delivers a payload based on ConnectWise ScreenConnect, another legitimate remote access tool.

Inside the dropped configuration file, the intent becomes clear:

The important part here is the relay server:

instance-p1b26i-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com

This tells the client exactly where to connect. Once installed, the system reaches out to that server and establishes a remote session.

Again, no exploit, no malware in the traditional sense, just legitimate software used to gain control.

A Familiar Pattern

This isn’t the first time I’ve seen something like this.

It closely resembles a campaign I previously analyzed where RMM tools were abused in a crypto wallet distribution flow:

One thing that stands out across both campaigns is how the payload is delivered.

In all cases, the final MSI files are not hosted directly on the phishing domains. Instead, the sites redirect users to gofile[.]io, a legitimate file-sharing service, to download the installer.

This adds another layer of evasion. Hosting the MSI on a legitimate service like gofile makes it harder to block and also reduces suspicion from users, since the download doesn’t come directly from the phishing domain.

While digging further into this, I also noticed that the MSI files are hosted across multiple gofile storage endpoints such as:

store-na-phx-[1/4/5].gofile.io/download/direct/

Changing the server index (for example, 1, 4, or 5) reveals similar download paths hosting MSI files that follow the same theme, crypto wallet installers that actually deploy RMM tools.

Combined with the use of legitimate tools like GoTo Resolve (LogMeIn) and delivery through trusted file-sharing services, the overall chain appears clean on the surface but ultimately leads to full remote access.

Indicators

URLs

v1desktop-yoroiwallet[.]com
yoroi-wallet[.]org
instance-p1b26i-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com
YoroiDesktop-installer.msi
yoroi-wallet.msi
CompanyId: 5504330483880245799
Namespace: syn-prd-ava-unattended

File Hash

8634ad3c6488d6a27719c5341e91eeb9
2a2d9b03aa6185f434568f5f4c42bf49
e79a47fc85955123f0821223a4cf2595
be8c2d03333cbd13dab654260c60b025

Crypto Compensation Scam: Fake BTC Payout Lure Abusing Survey & Payment Flows

Overview

I recently came across a message containing the following link:

hxxps://yandex[.]com/poll/PdZ7vgekGrNakuXZcpiB6b

At first, it didn’t look suspicious. It opened as a simple survey/poll page. But as I continued, the flow quickly shifted into a crypto reward scenario, claiming that I was eligible to receive a Bitcoin compensation payment.

And as expected with these kinds of lures, there’s a catch.

Before you can withdraw the funds, you’re asked to pay a small “commission” fee.

Full Scam Walkthrough (Video)

This gives a better idea of how smoothly the entire flow is designed to push the victim toward payment.

Infection / Lure flow

1. Initial Entry (Survey / Poll Page)

The flow starts with a Yandex poll link, which works as a kind of entry point.

This step likely serves multiple purposes. It helps make the interaction feel legitimate since it’s hosted on a known platform. It may also act as a basic filter to distinguish real users from automated systems. More importantly, it sets up the next stage of redirection.

2. Fake Bitcoin Compensation Page

After interacting with the poll, I was redirected to a page that looks like it belongs to a Bitcoin related service.

The page presents a sense of urgency by claiming that a new transaction of 0.943 BTC has been created and already marked as approved. It then introduces pressure by warning the user to withdraw the funds within 24 hours, a tactic commonly used to rush victims into taking immediate action without verifying the legitimacy of the claim.

This is where the emotional hook kicks in. Seeing a large amount like 0.943 BTC immediately grabs attention.

3. Social Engineering via Chat Assistant

Then a chat window appears, introducing a support agent.

The message explains that to complete the payment process, you need to register your profile in a compensation system. It sounds procedural and official, which is exactly the intention.

Shortly after, the real objective becomes clear.

You are asked to:

Pay $67 for legal profile registration services

4. Payment Gateway

Clicking the payment link takes you to a dedicated payment page.

Here, everything is carefully designed to appear legitimate and trustworthy. The page shows a specific payment amount of $67, provides a Bitcoin payment option via a QR code, and displays a wallet address to reinforce authenticity. On top of that, a countdown timer indicating invoice expiry adds urgency, subtly pressuring the user to complete the transaction quickly without questioning its validity.

The design mimics real crypto payment processors, which helps reduce suspicion.

The flow is quite structured and intentional.

It starts by engaging the user through a trusted platform, which lowers initial suspicion. Then it introduces a high-value crypto reward, creating excitement. A chat assistant adds a layer of interaction, making the process feel guided and legitimate.

Finally, the user is asked to pay a relatively small fee to unlock a much larger reward.

This is essentially an advance fee scam, adapted to fit into a crypto themed narrative.

Additional Variant Observed (Octa-Themed Flow)

While analyzing further, I encountered another link that follows the same backend scam logic, but with a different initial presentation.

The flow eventually leads to the same outcome, pay a commission to withdraw BTC.

Variant Walkthrough (Video)

1. Fake Account / Transfer Notification

This version starts with a fake dashboard impersonating Octa.

The page further attempts to lure users by displaying a message stating “You have a new money transfer”, along with a balance of 1.824 BTC. This presentation is crafted to create excitement and curiosity, making it seem like the user has unexpectedly received funds, while subtly encouraging them to engage with the page and follow the next steps without questioning its authenticity.

2. Fake Login & Temporary Password Flow

The user is asked to log in using a temporary password.

This step closely mimics real authentication flows to build trust and credibility. It displays a temporary password, includes an OTP style input field, and reinforces legitimacy with messaging like “Do not share this password!”. These familiar elements are designed to make the process feel secure and authentic, lowering suspicion while guiding the user further into the flow.

3. Transaction Dashboard

After logging in, the user is presented with a dashboard that appears highly convincing, displaying details such as the sender labeled as Octa, a balance of 1.824 BTC, and a status marked as paid. The layout, wording, and transaction details are all carefully crafted to create a sense of authenticity, making the entire interface look legitimate and encouraging the user to trust the process without suspicion.

4. Commission Justification

Before allowing any withdrawal, the platform introduces an additional requirement in the form of a commission fee of around $69, accompanied by an explanation about wallet limits and transfer rules. This step is designed to appear reasonable and procedural, giving the impression that the fee is a standard part of the process while subtly nudging the user to make a payment in order to access the supposed funds.

5. Payment Page

Just like the initial flow, the process ultimately leads to a familiar payment stage, presenting a Bitcoin payment request along with a QR code and a wallet address for convenience. An expiry timer is also displayed to create urgency, pressuring the user to act quickly and complete the payment without taking the time to question the legitimacy of the request.

What stands out is how the attackers reuse the same core scam but change the entry point.

I also looked into related activity on URLScan and found similar lures being actively scanned in the last couple of days, which indicates that this is not a one off campaign but something currently active and evolving.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

URLs

Along with the observed infrastructure, I checked domain registration timelines, which further indicate that this campaign is relatively recent and actively being used.

  • cosibas[.]site – Registered on 2026-01-30
  • paybits[.]cc – Registered on 2026-02-02

hxxps://yandex[.]com/poll/PdZ7vgekGrNakuXZcpiB6b
hxxps://yandex[.]com/poll/GjSFvwyKcmEMXpzm6yDExc
hxxps://cosibas[.]site/bloc/anketa-sent.html
hxxps://cosibas[.]site/octa/
hxxps://paybits[.]cc/payment/

RMM Abuse in a Crypto Wallet Distribution Campaign

Analysis of a Suspicious “Eternl Desktop” MSI Installer Dropping LogMeIn Resolve

Overview

A professionally written announcement email titled “Eternl Desktop Is Live — Secure Execution for Atrium & Diffusion Participants” is currently circulating within the Cardano community.

At first glance, the email appears legitimate and well aligned with Cardano’s governance narrative promoting security, decentralization, and staking incentives. However, deeper inspection of the download mechanism and installer behavior raises significant red flags.

Email Social Engineering Highlights

The email leverages high trust messaging and ecosystem specific incentives.

The email strategically references Atrium and the Diffusion Staking Basket to establish legitimacy within the Cardano ecosystem, while also making enticing claims of NIGHT and ATMA token rewards to drive user interest. It reinforces trust by emphasizing “local-first, non-browser signing,” positioning the application as a more secure alternative to browser based wallets. The overall messaging maintains a polished, professional tone with no visible spelling or grammatical issues, lending credibility to the communication. This is capped with a strong, authoritative call to action “Eternl Desktop is where Cardano decisions are finalized.” designed to create urgency and frame the software as an essential tool for serious Cardano participants.

Download Infrastructure Red Flags

The provided download URL, hxxps://download[.]eternldesktop[.]network, raises immediate concerns, as the domain appears to be newly created and lacks any established historical reputation. There is no independent verification or announcement from official, well known Eternl communication channels to validate its legitimacy. Additionally, the software is distributed as a direct MSI installer without publicly available checksums, digital signature transparency, or formal release notes, preventing users from independently verifying the integrity and authenticity of the installer before execution.

New infrastructure + wallet software + MSI installer is a high-risk combination.

Domain Information

MSI Installer Analysis

File Name: Eternl.msi
File Size: 23.3MB
File Type: Windows Intaller (MSI)
Hash: 8fa4844e40669c1cb417d7cf923bf3e0
Title: LogMeIn Resolve Unattended
Comments: LogMeIn Resolve Unattended v1.30.0.636

Using CFF Explorer, I identified an embedded executable within the MSI file. I then used LessMSI to extract the executable for further analysis.

Extracted Executable File

File Name: unattended-updater.exe
File Type: PE32
File Size: 23.35MB
Original File Name: GoToResolveUnattendedUpdater.exe
File Hash: 3f317e17741122cd4ea30123ba241cd0
File Description: LogMeIn Resolve

During dynamic analysis, the sample was observed writing log files and JSON artifacts to disk.

It also tried to connect to below domains.

  • hxxt://ip.zscaler.com
  • hxxt://zerotrust.services.gotoresolve.com
  • hxxt://dumpster.console.gotoresolve.com/api/live
  • hxxt://sessions.console.gotoresolve.com
  • hxxt://devices-iot.console.gotoresolve.com/
  • hxxps://devices.console.gotoresolve.com/properties
  • hxxps://applet.console.gotoresolve.com
  • hxxps://custombranding.console.gotoresolve.com

The executable is placed within a uniquely identified folder created under “C:\Program Files (x86)\GoTo Resolve Unattended“. All executables, along with JSON configuration files related to the RMM setup, are stored in this directory.

The unattended.json configuration file enables unattended access, allowing a technician to connect to the remote system without the end user being physically present.

The application attempts to connect to hxxps://dumpster.console[.]gotoresolve[.]com/api/sendEventsV2 to transmit event information in JSON format. The connection fails, and the application retries the request multiple times.

Why This Is Concerning

This behavior is concerning because Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools inherently provide powerful capabilities such as remote command execution, system monitoring, persistent access, and unattended control. While legitimate in enterprise environments, these features are frequently abused by threat actors during initial access operations, particularly in crypto themed malware campaigns and fake wallet or airdrop lures, where RMM software is leveraged to establish long-term post exploitation persistence on compromised systems.

While LogMeIn Resolve itself is a legitimate product, its silent delivery inside a wallet installer is not legitimate behavior.

Detection Summary

  • Flagged as PUA / Riskware
  • Behavioral indicators consistent with remote management agents
  • Not a known component of any official Eternl wallet release

Threat Assessment

IndicatorRisk
Newly registered download domainHigh
MSI installer for wallet softwareHigh
Drops RMM toolCritical
PUA classificationConfirmed

HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS – DO NOT INSTALL

This campaign exhibits multiple overlapping indicators consistent with supply-chain abuse and trojanized wallet distribution, combined with pre positioning techniques that leverage RMM tools to establish persistent access. Together, these behaviors suggest preparation for potential follow on activity, including future credential harvesting or cryptocurrency wallet compromise.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Domains:

  • download[.]eternldesktop[.]network

Files

  • etrnl.msi
  • unattended-updater.exe

Product Identifiers

  • LogMeIn Resolve
  • GoTo Resolve

Hash

  • 8fa4844e40669c1cb417d7cf923bf3e0
  • 3f317e17741122cd4ea30123ba241cd0

This campaign demonstrates how crypto governance narratives are increasingly weaponized to distribute covert access tooling under the guise of professional software.

Fake “Stable Genesis Airdrop” Campaign Delivering a Crypto Wallet Drainer via Phishing

In this analysis, I investigated a suspicious email titled “Stable Genesis Airdrop: Claim for Eligible Wallets Now Open”, which redirected victims to the domain:

hxxps://airdrop.stablereward[.]claims

Through sandbox execution, traffic inspection, and UI analysis, the campaign was confirmed to be a high confidence cryptocurrency phishing operation designed to steal wallet recovery phrases and authorize malicious blockchain transactions.

The site impersonates a fictitious project named “Stable”, abuses Cloudflare protection to evade automated detection, and deploys a fake wallet connection workflow that escalates into seed phrase harvesting.

Key Red Flags in Email Body

  • Claims gas fees are paid in USDT (technically incorrect for Ethereum)
  • Vague “Stable network” with no whitepaper, GitHub, or official domain
  • No verifiable project presence on CoinGecko or CoinMarketCap
  • Redirects to a non-standard .claims TLD

Domain and Infrastructure Analysis

Newly registered domains + crypto airdrops = classic scam pattern

WHOIS records show that the domain stablereward[.]claims was registered very recently on December 8, 2025, with an update made on December 17, 2025. The domain uses Cloudflare name servers.

Initial Page

The presence of a Cloudflare “Verify you are human” gate indicates an intentional attempt to restrict automated access, as it effectively blocks crawlers and many security scanners from analyzing the site’s content. This technique is commonly used by malicious or suspicious sites to evade sandbox detection and fingerprinting, ensuring that payloads or scam pages are only served to real users while analysis environments are filtered out.

Main Landing Page

The site displays fabricated statistics such as 142,847 eligible wallets and a 50 million token allocation to create a false sense of scale and legitimacy. These exaggerated numbers are paired with a prominent “Connect Wallet” call-to-action designed to lure users into authorizing wallet access

Wallet Interaction And Credential Harvesting

It lists:

  • MetaMask (recommended)
  • Trust Wallet
  • Coinbase Wallet
  • Ledger
  • Trezor
  • Phantom
  • OKX
  • Rabby
  • Uniswap Wallet

The most critical malicious behavior is observed when the site prompts users to “Import Wallet, Enter your 12-word recovery phrase” instead of invoking a legitimate wallet extension.

JavaScript Anti-Analysis Techniques

The observed JavaScript snippet is a deliberate anti-analysis technique used to disrupt inspection and automated execution. By invoking the debugger statement, the script forces execution to pause whenever browser developer tools are open, effectively halting code flow during analysis. This behavior can break automated sandboxes and dynamic analysis environments, compelling security analysts to manually bypass or modify the script before further investigation can continue.

Network Traffic Analysis

The site silently connects to multiple blockchain RPCs:

  • rpc.ankr[.]com/bsc
  • bsc-dataseed*[.]bnbchain.org
  • binance[.]nodereal[.]io

These indicators suggest that the operation is designed with multi-chain capability, targeting both Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain (BSC) users to maximize reach. Such setups typically perform wallet balance enumeration, NFT discovery, and malicious token approval requests that enable silent asset draining. The overall behavior closely matches well-known wallet drainer kits.

Attack Chain Summary

Confirmed Scam

All observed indicators clearly confirm malicious intent. The request for a wallet recovery phrase is explicitly malicious, the newly registered domain presents a high risk profile, and the so called project shows no verifiable legitimacy. On chain interaction analysis indicates RPC based draining behavior, while the presence of anti debugging JavaScript further reinforces deliberate evasion of analysis.

Indicators of Compromise – Domains

  • airdrop.stablereward[.]claims
  • stablereward[.]claims